

ZAMBIA AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STORY: THE BENEFITS OF ZAMBIA'S SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION WARS, 1966-1990

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ABSTRACT

This article has explored the impact of Zambia's support for the liberation wars of southern Africa, with a focus on her benefits. It has drawn on primary and secondary sources related to the benefits Zambia accrued as a result of supporting liberation struggles of southern African states in the period 1966-1990. I have argued that while Zambia in this period had been seen to be a victim of circumstance by many scholars, she greatly benefited from her action of supporting liberation struggles of southern Africa. These benefits were clearly seen in sectors such as transport, energy and fuel. They were also visible in military force as well as in hosting refugees. I have demonstrated that Zambia's support for liberation struggles had very little or no impact on her declining economy between 1974 and 1990. I have argued that the decline of Zambia's economy in this period was mainly due to the copper and oil shocks that severely hit Zambia.

KEYWORDS: Liberation Wars, Southern Africa, Frontline State, Zambia's Support, Zambia's Benefits

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INTRODUCTION

The period 1965-1990 was characterised by the liberation struggles in southern Africa. During this period most of Zambia's neighbours such as South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were at the peak of their liberation struggles. Zambia stood out as one of the frontline states that became immensely instrumental towards the emancipation of these southern African states. Zambia's first republican president Dr Kenneth Kaunda (now late), in 1966, declared that Zambia would not be independent and free until the rest of her southern African neighbours were free. With this statesman's declaration, Zambia played a key role in the liberation struggles of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. Zambia gave enormous support to the liberation movements of these countries. This support was based on her philosophy of humanism¹. The support included offering liberation movements recognition, transition and broadcasting facilities. It also included financial and material aid.

The support Zambia gave to the liberation struggles of southern Africa made her accrue several effects. These effects have two sides of the story. One side of the story focuses on the short term effects of Zambia's support for liberation wars. On this side of the story, one can clearly see Zambia accruing great cost in terms of human life, infrastructure and lost opportunity for her economic growth. Most scholars dealing with liberation

¹Humanism was Zambia's philosophy from 1967 to 1991 which espoused man-centeredness in all spheres of human endeavor. Dr. Kaunda and his UNIP government used this philosophy to make sure that the people of southern Africa were free from the yoke of colonialism, racism and apartheid.

struggles of southern Africa have concentrated on this side of the story. These scholars have attached several negatives to the effects of the support Zambia gave to liberation struggles in southern Africa. John Clark(1989: 10) claims that Zambia's support for various liberation struggles of southern Africa caused problems for her economy. He estimates the total cost of destabilisation by southern Africa including increased transport costs and trade loses to about US\$5 million each year. Euston Chiputa (2014:73) also claims that liberation struggles in southern Africa imperilled the Zambian economy both directly and indirectly. He reviews that Zambia lost enormously in economic and human terms. He maintains that the cost of reconstructing blown up infrastructure and of fleeing refugees and displaced Zambian populations put a severe toll on the Zambian economy. He says that a lot of Zambia's revenue had to be used to service the debt accrued during liberation wars. In addition, Clarence Chongo claims that Zambia's great contribution to the liberation struggles in southern Africa made her pay dearly in resources, human life and property. She estimates the cost of restoring rail and road bridges at US \$16,297,198². Finally, the first Zambian republican president Dr Kenneth Kaunda claims that Zambian economy was in tatters because of the liberation wars of southern Africa³. Hence, basing on data collected from this side of the story, it becomes all too easy to view the effect of Zambia's support for liberation struggles of southern Africa not as a blessing but a curse to Zambia and her inhabitants.

However, a discussion of the effects of liberation struggles on Zambia that limits itself only to this side of the story leaves out another important aspect of the effects of Zambia's support for the liberation wars, the other side of the story. This other side of the story puts liberation wars of southern Africa into perspective and analyses their long term effects on Zambia. By so doing, this side of the story reveals several benefits Zambia accrued as a result of supporting liberation wars of southern Africa. Research on this other side of the story is lacking. Many scholars have hardly seen the benefits Zambia accrued owing to her support for liberation wars of southern Africa. Even the few scholars such as Karen Jacobsen⁴, Clarence Chongo⁵ and Euston Chiputa⁶ who have seen few benefits have mentioned them in passing. They have mentioned them in relation to the negative effects of Zambia's support for liberation wars of southern Africa. Hence, these benefits have been disguised.

This article concentrates on this other side of the story. It investigates the positive and long term effects of southern African liberation wars on Zambia. The article discusses the benefits that Zambia accrued as a result of supporting the liberation struggles in southern Africa in the period covering the years 1966-1990. It reveals the effects of Zambia's support for liberation struggles as a blessing and not a curse. It does so by undertaking three tasks. Firstly, it illustrates how Zambia attained food and military security during liberation wars. Secondly, it shows how liberation wars helped Zambia to attain self-sufficiency in sectors such as transport, oil and energy. Finally, the article highlights how Zambia benefited from hosting refugees. To accomplish these three tasks, the article is divided into five areas. The first area highlights the

²Clarence Chongo. 2015. 'Decolonising southern Africa: A history of Zambia's role in Zimbabwe liberation struggle, 1964-1974'. *Ph. D Thesis*, University of Pretoria, p. 305.

³Clarence Chongo. 2016. "A good measure of sacrifice: Aspects of Zambia's contribution to the liberation wars in southern Africa, 1964-1975", *Zambia Social Science Journal* 6, 1: 12.

⁴Karen Jacobsen. 2002. "Can refugees benefit the state? Refugee resources and African state building". *The Journal of Modern Studies* 4, 4: 577.

⁵Clarence Chongo. 2015. 'Decolonising southern Africa: A history of Zambia's role in Zimbabwe liberation struggle, 1964-1974'. *Ph. D Thesis*, University of Pretoria, p. 305.

⁶Euston Chiputa. 2014. "Economic reforms in Zambia and India: Comparative trade and industrial policy during 1991-1992", in Theresa Moyo, ed. *Trade and industrial development in Africa: Rethinking strategy and policy*. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), p. 319.

benefits Zambia accrued as a result of hosting refugees from southern African states. The second area focuses on transport benefits. This area explores how railroad transport network greatly improved as a result of liberation wars of southern Africa. The next area investigates military benefits that Zambia accrued due to her support for liberation wars. The fourth area discusses fuel (oil) benefits that Zambia accrued during liberation wars. The last area explores energy sector benefits accrued by Zambia during liberation struggles of southern African states.

Benefits from Hosting Refugees

As a peaceful nation, Zambia has a long history of hosting refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s Zambia received scores of refugees from southern African states that were struggling against racism, colonialism and apartheid. Frischkom (2013:76) reports that the position of Zambian government at this time was that even though her finances and personnel had been taxed to the full, she had no option but to shelter her persecuted brothers and sisters in the spirit of humanism. This gesture led to refugee influx in Zambia. The refugee population in Zambia rose from 15,000 in 1968 to 150,000 in 1988⁷. This refugee influx saw the creation of three most important refugee settlements in Zambia. These were Meheba created in 1966, Mayukwayukwa in 1971 and Ukwimi in 1986.

Refugees in Zambia generated both burden and benefits to Zambian economy and citizens. However, the potential benefits for Zambia went beyond the burden imposed by this mass influx. This is because refugees in Zambia mostly depended on external assistance through United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). For example, in 1988, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees spent more than US\$233 161(99% of the total cost) to meet refugee needs in Zambia while the Zambian government only spent US\$1 727(1% of the total cost) in form of grants for refugees (Mwanza and Seshamani, 1988: 15). Since the bulk of funding came from outside, hosting refugees in Zambia was not a burden. It was instead a net benefit for Zambia because she greatly benefited from hosting refugees in a number of areas.

Food security is one area where hosting refugees seem to have benefited Zambia. In the early days refugees contributed to food shortages in Zambia. This is because Zambia needed large quantities of food to feed refugees. This partly contributed to food crisis in Zambia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in 1973, there was a food shortage which forced Zambia to accept food aid from the National Union for the Total Independence for Angola (UNITA) in what Fred Bridgland (1985:95) call a *humiliating gesture*⁸ from Jonas Savimbi. During these early days refugees became a burden to Zambia. In these early days therefore hosting refugees seem to be a curse to Zambia.

Later the Zambian government changed its approach towards refugees. The government began to actively involve refugees in agricultural and other entrepreneur activities. This made refugees become self-reliant in food production. Refugees even produced a food surplus for Zambia. For instance, Frischkom (2013:78) confirms that in 1977 Meheba production gave Zambia a food surplus. He also confirms that Meheba and Mayukwayukwa became the main suppliers of vegetables in the southern African region. Mwanza & Seshamani (1988: 15) claim that in 1988 the refugees inhabiting Ukwimi settlement in Petauke district of eastern Zambia harvested 1000 bags of maize. Besides food production, refugees

⁷A.M Mwanza& V. Seshamani. 1988. *Refugees as an important aspect of the human dimension of Africa's economic crisis: Zambia case study*. Paper prepared for the 25th Asank Conference on 'The Refugee Situation in Africa'. 14-16 September 1988. Cambridge, UK, p. 3.

⁸It was humiliating gesture because during this period of cold war UNITA supported anti-communism block (capitalism block) while Zambia supported communism block. Hence, UNITA was more like an enemy of Zambia. Receiving food from an enemy was definitely a humiliating occurrence.

introduced the skill of growing rice (*Oryza sativa*) in Northwestern province of Zambia. Rice became one of the staple foods in the province. In this way refugees became instrumental in food production in Zambia. Their high food production improved food security in Zambia. Refugee production greatly contributed to making Zambia a food self-sufficient nation. For instance, Simson (1985: 92) discloses that in 1980, Zambia was 79% food self-sufficient. By 1990, Zambia had become 100% self-sufficient in food production. The nation had now done away with external assistance in form of food aid⁹.

Refugees also made significant contributions to Zambia's economy. For example, refugees at Meheba settlement boosted the economy of north western region through rice production. Through refugee production North western province became a rice exporting region. Pip Tyler (2008:12) claims that the settlement even supplied large quantities of rice to World Food Programme (WFP). In addition, rice became a major contributor to food security in the region. Even to date North western province has remained one of the main rice growing province. In 2004 the province was ranked the fourth rice growing region in Zambia¹⁰.

In addition, refugees became a blessing to Zambia in the area of education. Both the Zambian government and UNHCR provided basic education to refugees. For example, in 1986, Zambian government total authorised capital expenditure for schools for refugees amounted to US\$71 087 (Mwanza & Seshamani: 15). Zambians living near refugee settlements accessed the education facilities meant for refugees. This reduced illiterate levels among locals. Thus, refugees partly contributed to the reduction of illiteracy in Zambia. Luchembe (2016:14) confirms that illiterate rate in Zambia reduced from 67% in 1964 to 41% in 1980.

Zambians also benefited from other social services meant for refugees. Through UNHCR, the refugees were provided with basic food, shelter, access to clean water and sanitation as well as health and market services. Refugees shared these facilities with the locals. Through this sharing the locals had access to reliable health facilities. They also had clean and safe water. The locals living near refugee settlements also had readily available markets for their products. These social services became instrumental in reducing mortality rate and poverty levels among Zambians especially those living near refugee camps.

Finally, refugee influx provided long term gains in the area of defence force. Zambia's acceptance of refugees led to numerous military threats especially in border areas. The neighbouring white regimes of southern Africa launched several air and land incursions across Zambian borders in retaliation to Zambia's action of hosting refugees. These incursions became a threat to national security. In order to strengthen its grips on border areas, Zambian government added a third wing, Zambia National Service (ZNS), to her defence force in 1971. B.J Phiri (2001: 6) confirms that the initial objective of Zambia National Service was to provide basic military instruction to all Zambian citizens in the event they needed to be mobilised as reservists during liberation wars of southern Africa. But later Zambia National Service combined military training and training in agricultural and other survival skills. Soldiers trained by the Zambia National Service were now expected to contribute to the security of the nation and the production of food for the nation. They were also responsible for public works projects.

Zambia National Service became very important to Zambia and her citizens mainly for four reasons. Firstly, it boosted national security in Zambia. Soldiers trained by Zambia National Service, popularly as the '*Green Uniformed*

⁹Grafiska Motala. 2000. *Foreign Aid, Debt and Growth in Zambia*. Uppsala: NordiuskaAfrikanstitet, p. 47

¹⁰FEWS NET, *Zambia Annual Harvest Report, October 2004*, p. 5.

Soldiers', tightened national security especially in border areas. Secondly, Zambia National Service reduced unemployment levels and dependent syndrome among Zambians especially the youths. Zambian youths became productive since they were equipped with survival skills in agriculture, carpentry, bricklaying and other fields. This in turn reduced poverty levels among Zambians. In addition, Zambia National Service greatly contributed to food security in Zambia. This was done through crop production and livestock keeping. Zambia National Service camps produced variety of crops and domesticated different animals. Finally, Zambia National Service helped the government to reduce expenditure on public work projects. The Zambian government mostly used Zambia National Service soldiers to do public works such as construction of bridges, dams, roads, rails and other infrastructure at a minimal cost. This reduced government expenditure on public works and in turn helped government to serve much needed national revenue.

In summary, Zambia and her citizens greatly benefited from hosting refugees both directly and indirectly. Refugees helped Zambia to improve on food security, health facilities, literate levels, military operations and general economies. Locals accessed several basic social services meant for refugees such as clinics, clean water, food, markets, etc. Therefore, Zambia's benefits outweighed the cost or burden the refugees generated on Zambia. Refugees were not a drain of Zambia's resources. Hosting refugees was indeed a profitable venture for Zambia and her citizens.

Transport (Railroad) Sector Benefits

Zambia's support for various liberation movements caused problems for her railroad transport. This because Zambia heavily depended on transportation through her southern African neighbours. Between 1964 and 1975, Zambia had to rely on South Africa, Mozambique or Rhodesia for nearly all its communication with the outside world. From October 1964 to January 1965, Zambia's primary link to the sea was via the Rhodesian railway. All her copper exports and 95% of her imports were carried through this railway to the Mozambican port of Beira and Lourenco Marques. Following Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith on 11 November 1965, Rhodesia became not only unfriendly but also actively hostile neighbour to Zambia. She closed the Rhodesian railway in January 1965. This was after Zambia decided to side with the United Nations (UN)'s decision to impose sanctions on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The closure of Rhodesia railway forced Zambia to turn to Mozambique. Between 1965 and 1975 Zambia almost entirely depended on the Benguela railway¹¹ which ran from the Copperbelt region of Zambia westwards through Angola to the port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean. The Benguela railway became the most viable route to the sea for Zambia's imports and exports after the closure of Rhodesia railway. Unfortunately for Zambia, Simson (1985:54) confirms that the Benguela railway was also closed in January 1975 as a result of liberation struggles in Angola. The closure of both the Rhodesia and Benguela railways disrupted Zambia's railroad network. Zambia was now left with no reliable route to the sea for her imports and exports. At this point Zambia's support for liberation struggles seemed to be a curse for her and its citizens.

As the first and temporal measure, Zambia turned to the use of the Great North Road. This road became the only major link by which Zambia's goods could be imported or exported. In order to efficiently handle Zambia's exports and imports, the Zambian government upgraded the road earlier in 1966¹². This upgrading improved the state of the road which was previously popularly known as "the Hell Run" due its bad state. This improvement turned liberation struggles into a blessing to Zambia. This is because the upgrade reduced the occurrence of accidents. However, the use of Great North

¹¹Simon E Katzenellenbogen. 1982. *South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railway and Trade in the making of a relationship*. Manchester: Manchester University press, p. 178.

¹²Government Printers, *Republic of Zambia Economic Report*, 1966, p 21.

Road proved to be very expensive to the Zambian government since it required regular maintenance. Zambia lost huge sums of money to do routine and annual maintenance works. This created financial problems for Zambia. This problem was partly solved by the construction of an alternative railroad transport route called Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) in June 1975¹³. Chongo (2015: 319) claims that TAZARA was the largest single foreign aid project undertaken by China at the construction cost of US\$500,000,000. The railway stretched from Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia's central province through Northern Province to the Tanzanian town of Dar-es-salaam on the Indian Ocean. It covered a total distance of 1,860 kilometres.

The Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority was very important to Zambia since it boosted her economy. Internally, the use of an expensive route, the Great North Road, for the transportation of Zambian cargo drastically reduced. This meant that Zambia served the much needed revenue usually means for routine maintenance works. Externally, the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority made the imports and exports via foreign railways to drastically drop. Simson, (1985: 54) reveals that by 1980 Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority carried 50% of all goods and copper exports. He further claims that by 1983 Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority carried 75% of Zambian cargo. This means that by 1983 only 25% of Zambia's imports and exports went through expensive neighbouring southern African transport routes. Thus, Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority greatly contributed towards alleviating Zambia's railroad transport problems. Chongo (2015:319) discloses that within ten years of independence Zambia snapped almost all its economic links with Rhodesia. Andrew Roberts (1976: 228) says Zambia also managed to reduce her dependence on South Africa. Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority really saved Zambia from its expensive southern African transportation links. This helped Zambia to serve transportation cost revenue. Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority was therefore instrumental in not only mitigating Zambia's transport challenges but also laying a strong foundation for the country to become self-sufficient in railroad sector. Besides this, Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority stimulated economic development in vast and neglected areas both in Zambia and Tanzania. The railway line created trade opportunities since locals along the line of rail found ready markets for their products. Finally, Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority played an important role in the Black central African Nationalist struggles of the late 1970s and 1980s. The railway served as a trade route for Zambia and Malawi since it did not pass through white regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique¹⁴. The Africans from these two central African states traded among each other using this route. All this makes Zambia's support for liberation struggles of southern Africa a blessing to Zambia and central African citizens.

Military Benefits

Militarily, at the first glance of the effects of Zambia's support for liberation wars of southern Africa, one would see several negatives. These negative effects include death, rape, assaults and robberies of innocent civilians. One would also see destruction of property and infrastructure as well as huge military debts accrued over time. However, at the second and critical glance, one would view several benefits of Zambia's support for liberation wars of southern Africa. These benefits become visible when one views the military role that the liberation wars played on Zambia Defence Force (ZDF).

The liberation struggles of southern Africa played three important military roles on Zambia Defence Force. Firstly, liberation wars helped Zambia Defence Force to minimise trainings abroad. The presence of liberation movements

¹³See Bertha Zimba. 1990. *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (Tazara): An analysis of Zambia's decision-making in transportation*. Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick pub. Co.

¹⁴Blaine Harden. *The little Railroad that could*. The Washington Post. 7 July 1987, p. 3

and refugees from Rhodesia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa made Zambia a military target. Zambia faced continuous military threats. This forced Zambian government of Dr Kenneth Kaunda to consider accelerating training of its indigenous people at home. David Khoudour(2017:43) confirms that initially in the early 1960s, Zambian army officers were sent abroad for training in countries such as Britain, Canada, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. But later in the late 1960s and 1970s two indigenous military training institutions were established in Kabwe district of central Zambia. Defence Services Command and Staff College was established in 1970 to train senior officers of the Zambia Defence Force to enhance capacity building in military operations. The Military Training Establishment of Zambia (MILTEZ), formerly called SMT, was established in the late 1960s to train military officers. The building of these institutions minimised training abroad. Local trainings were maximised so as to maintain Zambia's sovereignty and integrity. These local trainings minimised training costs and served the much needed national revenue. It also made Zambia adequately train her local defence force. This defence force (Zambia Defence Force) had now capacity to ward off all enemy attacks on Zambia between 1970 and 1990.

Secondly, liberation wars of southern Africa helped Zambia to adequately equip her defence force. Initially, Zambia did not have well equipped defence force. But later, as the liberation wars intensified in her neighbouring countries, Zambia had to arm herself militarily against possible aggression by procuring weapons and other military hardware from friendly countries such as Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, China and the Soviet Union. Chongo (2015:318) confirms that some countries which were sympathetic to the liberation struggles in southern Africa such as China even dominated equipment to Zambia. Zambia also received a small amount of military materials from Peking and Moscow¹⁵. Thus, through her support, Zambia came out of liberation war period well equipped militarily. This made Zambia Defence Force have capacity to effectively deal with all her enemies from late 1970s onwards.

Liberation wars also helped Zambia to localise its defence force leadership and personnel. Between 1964 and 1967, Zambia depended on a relatively small number of white senior officers and technical personnel. In 1967, Zambian government under the leadership of Kenneth David Kaunda began to replace these white army officers with foreign officers on contract. Between 1967 and 1970 the majority of senior officers of Zambia Defence Force were seconded from the British army. In addition, Zambia Defence Force was commanded by expatriate officers from Britain up to 1970. Major General Michael Griggs was army commander of Zambia Defence Force from 1964 to 1967. He was succeeded by Major General T.S Reids who commanded the Zambia Defence Force up to December 1970. Towards the end of 1970 the leadership of Zambia Defence Force changed hands from British to indigenous Zambians. This change saw the appointment of several indigenous senior officers and technical personnel. The change also saw the appointment of General Kingsley Chinkuli, at the age of 31, as the first indigenous Zambian army commander on 28th December 1970. These local appointments were meant to protect Zambia's integrity and sovereignty during and after liberation wars of southern Africa. The local appointments made Zambia achieve several milestones in the area of defence.

Lastly, liberation wars facilitated the drastic growth of Zambia Defence Force. Lindeman(2010: 11) reports that at independence the UNIP government of Kenneth Kaunda inherited a small army of only 2,900 soldiers from colonial government of Northern Rhodesia. This army could not match the magnitude of threats Zambia faced. Hence, the Zambian Defence Force failed to ward off the enemy attacks on Zambia. However, this scenario changed as Zambia faced continuous security threats from South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique during their liberation

¹⁵Irving Kaplan, *Zambia: A country study*, (Washington DC, 1979), p. 43.

struggles. To overcome these security challenges, Zambia was forced to recruit several indigenous Zambians into Zambia Defence Force especially through Zambia Nation Service trainings. This made the size of the Zambia Defence Force rapidly expand from 4400 in 1968 to 16200 in 1986 (Lindeman, 2010: 11). This drastic growth enabled Zambia to face its threats squarely by the time the liberation wars reached their peaks in the late 1970s and 1980s. The growth made Zambia Defence Force with stand many challenges facing Zambia both internally and externally. These challenges included Mshala rebellion¹⁶, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) incursions and food riots in the 1980s.

In summary, militarily, liberation wars of southern Africa were a blessing to Zambia for three reasons. Firstly, the wars helped Zambia to redesign and expand its defence force. If it were not for the security threats facing Zambia during liberation struggles of her southern neighbours Zambia Defence Force would have remained permanently or for some time with only two military structures namely the Zambia Army (ZA) and Zambia Air Force (ZAF). A third structure namely the Zambia Nation Service would have been neglected or it would have taken Zambia several decades to have it. This is because according to B.J Phiri (2001:6) Zambia Nation Service, as a third wing of Zambia Defence Force, was formed in 1971 to specifically respond to the military threat arising from liberation wars. The absence of this third wing would mean that food security would have been partly compromised in Zambia. This is because Zambia Nation Service greatly contributed to Zambia's attainment of food security.

Secondly, liberation wars enabled Zambia have well equipped and adequately trained defence force. Initially, Zambia Defence Force was young, inexperienced and relatively out-resourced. It was unable to deal with adequately trained and equipped defence forces of her neighbouring white regimes. Military threats arising from liberation wars forced Zambian government to consider accelerating the training of its citizens. It also enabled Zambia procure several military equipment. This made Zambia Defence Force became well equipped and adequately trained.

Finally, liberation wars played a significant role in maturing Zambia Defence Force within a very short period of time. Within a decade, the Zambia Defence Force matured from a young (small), inexperienced, ill-trained and inadequately equipped defence force to a strong, experienced, well trained and adequately equipped defence force. This change enabled Zambia defence force to effectively deal with both internal and external security threats facing Zambia. For example, the Zambia Defence Force managed to quell the Mshala rebellion which lasted from 1975 to 1982. It also managed to suppress the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) incursions from 1977 to 1992. It also managed to stop the widespread riots that rocked the country in the 1980s. This makes the Zambia's resources allocated to the military and Zambia's support for liberation wars justifiable. It was not wasteful as some scholars argue. Zambia really benefited from her action of supporting liberation wars in the military sector.

Fuel (Oil) Sector Benefits

Before the commencement of liberation wars in southern Africa, Zambia entirely depended on Rhodesia for oil supplies. Much of Zambian oil supplies came from Central African Petroleum Refineries in Rhodesia. In 1965, Zambia faced the first blow of the effects of her support for liberation struggles when the oil pipeline from Beira to southern Rhodesia was closed in December. This left Zambia without an alternative oil supply. However, Zambia turned this challenge into opportunity by investing heavily in her own oil transportation infrastructure. This move led to the construction of the Tanzania Zambia Mafuta (TAZAMA) oil pipeline and Indeni Oil Refinery.

¹⁶Read Gideon S Were. 1974. *A History of South Africa*. Holmes & Meier publications.

Tanzania Zambia Mafuta was built by a subsidiary of the Italian State Oil Company called SnamProgetti at a total construction cost of US\$336,574 in 1968 (Andrew Deroche: 2008, 89). It was officially opened in September 1968 by Zambian and Tanzanian presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere respectively. Tanzania Zambia Mafuta was initially constructed to pump finished petroleum products from Dar esSalaam to the Zambian Copperbelt. Later, in 1973, it was converted into a petroleum feedstock pipeline after Indeni was built. Since then it had been transporting petroleum feedstock. Indeni oil refinery was built in 1973 at a total cost of US\$25,000,000 (David Khoudous, 2017:89). It was born out of government concerted effort aimed at ensuring that Zambia had a guaranteed, sure and stable supply of petroleum products. It was built as a simple distillation to process commingled petroleum feedstock.

Tanzania Zambia Mafuta oil pipeline and Indeni oil refinery contributed significantly towards eliminating the problem of rampant fuel shortages that engulfed the Zambian economy since 1965. The two projects did not only mitigate oil problems facing Zambia but also laid a strong foundation for Zambia to become self-sufficient in fuel sector. Despite being costly projects, both Tanzania Zambia Mafuta oil pipeline and Indeni oil refinery were a blessing to Zambia since at least one key component of national security-a reliant oil supply had been secured. It is therefore not wrong to conclude that liberation wars of southern Africa were not a curse to Zambia. Zambia's support for these wars was not a loss or share waste of time and resources. It was really a blessing to Zambia and her inhabitants.

Energy Sector Benefits

Initially, Zambia heavily depended on energy supply through her neighbouring Rhodesia. Much of Zambia's electricity came from the Kariba hydroelectric power station on the south bank of the Zambezi. In addition, all her coal came from Wankie in Rhodesia. Zambia's support for liberation wars caused problems for her energy sector since her action forced Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to cut ties with her. Zambia no longer accessed coal and electricity from Zimbabwe. This created critical shortage of coal and electricity supplies in Zambia.

To overcome these energy challenges the government of Kaunda had to put in place alternative solutions. Between 1965 and 1971, Zambia underwent diversification process whose effects involved the construction of Lusiwasi (1969), Kafue George (1972) and Kariba North Bank (1976) hydroelectric power stations¹⁷. The three hydroelectric power stations provided sufficient capacity to satisfy the country's requirements for electricity during and after liberation struggles of southern Africa. Thus, by 1977 Zambia had done away with much of her foreign electricity supplies. In the area of coal supplies, in 1966 a coal mining industry was established at Nkandawe in the southern province of Zambia. Unfortunately, this coal mine was closed in 1969. However, the closure did not negatively affect Zambia since in 1968 a vast open cast coal mine was opened at Maamba. By 1971, coal imports from Rhodesia had been replaced by local supplies at Maamba¹⁸. These electricity and coal projects not only made a significant contribution towards increasing Zambia's energy needs but also laid a strong base for the country to become self-sufficient in the energy sector. In this way, Zambia's support for liberation struggles was beneficial to her in the energy sector. If it were not for liberation wars Zambia would have taken long to develop her own energy sector. This because she would have been comfortable with her previous international agreements in the energy sector. Liberation wars helped Zambia to reduce energy imports. This in turn made Zambia serve much needed foreign exchange.

¹⁷Hazel Zulu, *Visionary KK laid electricity foundation*, Zambia Daily Mail Limited, Lusaka, 21 June 2021, p. 22.

¹⁸Republic of Zambia, *Third National Development Plan, 1979-1982*, pp. 253-258

In summary, the liberation struggles of southern African states had huge impact on Zambia's energy supplies. The wars helped Zambia overcome coal and hydroelectric power deficits. Zambia also reduced energy imports and in turn served much needed foreign exchange. The wars also helped Zambia improve the lives of her citizens through job creation. Many Zambians were employed in the newly created coal mines and hydroelectric power stations. This reduced unemployment rates and poverty levels in Zambia. Thus, Zambia's support for liberation wars of southern Africa was a blessing to her in the energy sector.

CONCLUSION

The article has demonstrated that Zambia greatly benefited from her action of supporting liberation wars of southern Africa in the period 1966-1990. Firstly, the article has demonstrated that Zambia turned several challenges she faced during liberation struggles into opportunities. The hostile environment created by liberation wars enabled Zambia to undergo diversification processes. This led to the construction of Tanzania Zambia Mafuta (TAZAMA) oil pipeline (1968), Lusiwasi hydroelectric power station (1969), Kafue Gorge hydroelectric power station (1972), Indeni oil refinery (1973), Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) (1975) and Kariba North Bank (1976). It also led to the establishment of an independent and permanent coal mine at Maamba in 1968. These costly projects not only mitigated Zambia's oil, transport and energy problems but also helped Zambia to secure her three key components of national security-reliable oil, transport and energy sectors. This made Zambia minimise her dependence on southern African neighbours in these three sectors. It also made Zambia serve her much needed foreign exchange.

Secondly, the article has shown that Zambia greatly benefited from hosting refugees from her neighbouring countries of southern Africa. It has illustrated that refugees became a blessing to Zambia and her inhabitants in many ways. For instance, refugees helped Zambia to attain food security through their engagement in agricultural activities. Refugee food production partly made Zambia become self-sufficient in food production. By 1990, Zambia had done away with external or foreign food aid. Refugees also boosted the economy of North Western region by making it a rice exporting region. Refugees introduced a skill of rice growing in this region. Both the refugees and the locals produced surplus rice which was exported. Lastly, refugees helped Zambia to reduce illiterate and maternal rates through sharing their education and health facilities with the locals around their settlements. Therefore, hosting refugees was not a burden to Zambia. It was really a blessing to Zambia and her people.

Finally, the article has demonstrated that Zambia yielded several military benefits from her support for liberation struggles of southern Africa. The hostile environment created by liberation wars helped Zambia to redesign and expand her defence force. Zambia Nation Service (ZNS) was created in response to many military threats facing Zambia during liberation struggles of her southern African neighbours. This meant that by 1971 Zambia Defence Force had now three wings, namely, the Zambia Army (ZA), Zambia Air Force (ZAF) and Zambia Nation Service (ZNS). The Zambia Defence Force also drastically grew numerically from a total population of 2 900 soldiers in 1964 to 16 200 soldiers in 1986. Military threats engineered by her neighbouring states also helped Zambia to adequately train and equip her defence force. Thus, liberation wars helped Zambia Defence Force to mature within a short period of time. The Zambia Defence Force had now capacity to effectively deal with both internal and external threats facing Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s.

In a nutshell, the funds and other resources Zambia allocated to service defence force, refugees and various capital projects were not wasteful. They were an investment for Zambia and her citizens. Zambia economically benefited from her action of supporting liberation wars. Zambia's socio-economic benefits went beyond any burden the liberation wars

could have impinged on Zambia and her citizens. This is contrary to Caleb Fundanga (2005: 2)'s assertion that the negative impacts of liberation wars on Zambia outweighed the positive ones. It must be clear that the economic challenges facing Zambia from 1974 to 1990 had little or no connection with Zambia's support for liberation struggles of southern Africa. Like Katherine Gough¹⁹ and Temba Chirwa²⁰ have argued, the economic challenges facing Zambia during this period were mainly due to the international shocks (the copper and oil shocks) that severely hit Zambia.

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